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ALFRED MUDGE*

Restructuring Private and
Public Sector Debt: Country
Debt Structure?
As ownership distinguishes the public sector from the private sector,
liability on the debt distinguishes public sector debt from private sector
debt. The sovereign is liable on public sector debt.I The sovereign is not
liable on private sector debt.
This distinction is subject to question and change if the foreign currency
debt of the private sector is restructured simultaneously with the foreign
currency debt of the public sector of one country. This article examines
a few of the differences and tensions between restructuring private and
public sector debt. 2 Country debt restructure may involve restructuring
both private and public sector debt; and restructuring both sectors si-

*Shearman & Sterling, New York.
1. This is generally true as a practical matter if not strictly true as a legal matter. See
Part Ill below.
2. This article was originally presented as a paper to the Section of International Law
and Practice of the American Bar Association in London in July 1985. This article is intended
as a general discussion of issues common to a number of situations and not as a description
or characterization of any particular situation or of any specific approach to a common
issue. For similar general discussions, see Levin, Conflicts of Law in a Multinational Bankruptcy: An Overview of the Issues, in DEFAULT AND RESCHEDULING: CORPORATE AND
SOVEREIGN BORROWERS IN DIFFICULTY (1984); Mudge, Sovereign Debt Restructuring: A
Current Perspective, DEFAULT AND RESCHEDULING: CORPORATE AND SOVEREIGN BORROWERS IN DIFFICULTY (1984); Mudge, Sovereign Debt Restructure: Perspective of Counsel
to Agent Banks, Bank Advisory Groups and Servicing Banks, 23 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L
L. 59 (1984); R. Thomas & M. Walker, Treatment of Private Sector Debt, Views on Legal
Topics Associated with International Debt Restructurings, A Report of the Institute of
International Finance Working Party on the Future of International Bank Lending (1984);
Walker & Bucheit, Legal Issues in the Restructuring of Commercial Bank Loans to Sovereign
Borrowers, in SOVEREIGN LENDING: MANAGING LEGAL RISK (1984).
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multaneously may affect the predictable restructure process for each
sector.
Restructuring private sector debt has generally been a separate and
distinct exercise from restructuring sovereign or public sector debt. One
basic difference is the legal framework. The restructure of private sector
debt is ultimately subject to the supervision of a bankruptcy or reorganization court in one or more countries, in the absence of contractual agreement between debtor and creditors. However, there are no bankruptcy
or reorganization laws clearly applicable to sovereign or public sector
debt, and restructure of public sector debt occurs outside the courtroom
and only when debtor and creditors record their mutual agreement by
contract. Nevertheless, the basic question is always the same: who pays,
lends or defers payment of how much, when and at what price?
I. Private Sector Debt Restructure
Creditors' rights, bankruptcy, corporate reorganizations and restructuring private sector debt are active areas of private practice in many
countries. Much of this work is purely domestic in the sense that it
involves a debtor, creditors, assets, bankruptcy, reorganization and suspension of payment laws and courts in a single country and debt denominated in the local currency. Yet international and cross-border issues
are frequently relevant to private sector debt when, for example, the
debtor has creditors and assets in more than one country, the debtor is
subject to the courts of more than one jurisdiction, the debt documentation is governed by more than one body of law, the debtor and its
assets are subject to bankruptcy and reorganization laws of more than
one country, or the debt is denominationed in both foreign currency and
local currency. Concurrent or ancillary bankruptcy proceedings under
the laws of more than one country are possible, and the outcome before
a court in any jurisdiction may depend as much on doctrines of comity
and conflict of laws as on the substantive laws affecting creditors' and
debtors' rights.
Restructuring private sector debt outside the bankruptcy and reorganization court may involve a major international business and legal effort
by the creditors of the private sector debtor, and special attention or
subsidies from the public sector-even when there is no concurrent public
sector restructuring. The names of Chrysler in the United States, Dunlop
in the United Kingdom, and Dome in Canada are reminders of both the
systemic importance and difficulty of the effort. A common denominator
of these efforts is obvious: none involved the simultaneous restructure of
the sovereign or public sector debt of the home country of the debtor,
but there was significant governmental involvement.
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II. Public Sector Debt Restructure
Restructuring sovereign or public sector debt is not a new phenomenon,
but the number of countries and amount of debt involved in the current
process is dramatic. Two common denominators of these efforts are equally
obvious and important. First, the restructure of the sovereign or public
sector debt is inevitably an international effort involving foreign currency
debt payable to foreign creditors. Secondly, restructuring public sector
debt does not directly affect any private sector debt which may be outstanding. In countries where there is relatively little foreign currency debt
of the private sector, the public sector debt is understandably the primary
focus in the restructuring exercise. However, in countries where there is
substantial foreign currency debt of both the private sector and public
sector, debt restructure becomes more complicated, and a series of tough
questions must be faced to determine whether and how there may be any
linkage between restructuring private and public sector debt.
III. The Linkage Question
On one level, the two basic distinctions between the public sector external debt and private sector external debt (i.e., liability and legal framework) tend to encourage separate restructuring exercises. While the sovereign (including most public sector debtors) is not subject to any
bankruptcy or reorganization court, the sovereign will generally stand
behind all public sector debt in the restructuring process in order to preserve access of the entire public sector to the credit markets. Both the
country and foreign creditors will want to deal with the pure sovereign
risk (the public sector debt) in one package. The private sector debt of a
country will involve different debtors, different security, different private
sector guarantors (foreign parent companies in some cases) and different
commercial risks depending on the particular business of the individual
private sector debtor. The prospects before the local bankruptcy or reorganization court will also vary depending on the individual private sector
debtor. All of these factors tend to separate the restructuring process for
private sector debt into a separate exercise for each debtor.
On a second level, the distinction between the public and private sectors
may be irrelevant to the foreign creditor with exposure to both sectors
in a country. If a sufficient number of foreign creditors with exposure to
both public and private sectors coordinate their approach to the problems
in each sector, simultaneous restructure of the foreign currency debt of
both the public and private sectors may occur. Similarly, the country may
seek a joint solution for the foreign currency debt of both sectors simply
because its finance minister and central bank have to arrange for a coherent
structure in the country's external balance of payments and trade. Also,
SUMMER 1986
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nationalization may instantaneously move a debtor from the private sector
into the public sector. Where there is significant private sector debt denominated in foreign currency, exchange rates and the availability of foreign exchange to the private sector will be factors in the assessment by
a foreign creditor of its overall country risk.
Government policies may frequently determine the ability of private
sector debtors to restructure their own debt and to recover economically
and financially in the context of the economic adjustment program implemented by the government for the entire country, frequently with the
support of a Stand-by or Extended Fund Facility from the International
Monetary Fund. The economic adjustment program for the country may
affect the commercial prospects for each individual private sector debtor.
Moreover, a private company operating profitably in local currency simply
cannot pay foreign currency debt unless it can obtain foreign currency.
Depreciation of the local currency against foreign currency makes payment of foreign currency debt more difficult when private sector earnings
are in local currency and inflation of local currency earnings does not
keep abreast of the depreciation of local currency against foreign currency.
Where exchange controls exist, the price and availability of foreign exchange depend on the sovereign. The payment of private sector foreign
currency debt may become the responsibility of the sovereign as a practical matter, if not a legal matter.
The extent to which the restructure of private sector debt is linked to
the restructure of public sector debt is understandably a real variable in
each case. The greater the linkage, the more complex the entire process.
The greater the linkage, the greater the risk that the package is so comprehensive that it cannot be implemented on a coordinated basis. The
greater the creditor exposure to both public and private sectors, the greater
the requirement that the linkage question be addressed on a coordinated
and constructive basis.
IV. Methods of Linkage
Methods of linking private and public sector debt restructure merit
description with the caveats that the process evolves and that the following
oversimplified and will certainly be incomplete
descriptions are somewhat
3
tomorrow, if not today.

3. The following description of linkage methods is intended to be merely descriptive,
without either endorsing or criticizing either linkage or any particular method. The solution
for the Kingdom of Oz will not necessarily work for the Republic of Zo, and the feasible
alternatives in different situations will vary widely.
VOL. 20, NO. 3
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THE NEW MONEY REQUEST

Many of the recent efforts to deal with country debt problems have
involved new loans to the country or its central bank. The request to each
foreign bank to extend additional credit has been based on the exposure
of the individual bank to the country, and exposure typically includes
debt outstanding to both the private sector and the public sector. Here,
linkage between private sector debt and public sector debt is clearly established by combining both for the purpose of the new money request
by the country, frequently with the endorsement of the International Monetary Fund and bank regulators.
B.

PUBLIC SECTOR SUPPORT FOR
PRIVATE SECTOR DEBT RESTRUCTURE

Private sector debt restructure may require or involve support from the
public sector in different ways, not all of which will be present in any
one situation.

1. Assumption or Guaranty
Private sector debt may be assumed or guaranteed by a public sector
obligor. This may be done by direct contractual assumption of the private
sector debt, by direct contractual guaranty of private sector debt, and by
nationalization of a private sector debtor. The first two methods generally
involve mutual agreement with the foreign creditor. The third does not.
Private sector debt subject to restructure may already benefit from a
guaranty from a public sector guarantor. Here, a basic question is whether
to restructure in the public sector restructuring, the private sector restructuring, or both, either simultaneously or consecutively. One approach
is to call on the public sector guaranty and either receive payment under
the guaranty or restructure the public sector guaranty obligation in the
context of the restructuring of public sector debt. A second approach is
to restructure the private sector debt in the context of the restructuring
of the private sector debtor and to maintain and confirm the public sector
guaranty. A third approach is to restructure the private sector debt with
the public sector guaranty, but on a basis where the public sector guaranty
may itself be subject to restructure as public sector debt if the guaranty
is ever called.
A common denominator of all three approaches is that the assumption
or guaranty of private sector debt by the public sector obligor occurs
irrespective of the commercial circumstances of the private sector debtor.
Modifications may involve a public sector guaranty limited to "political"
or "sovereign" risks or other specifically identified circumstances. Here,
the "commercial" risks would be left solely with the foreign creditor and
SUMMER 1986
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without public sector support. The problems of defining and distinguishing
between "sovereign," "political" and "commercial" risks are real-a
challenge for debtor and creditor as a business matter and counsel as a
drafting matter. Is the exchange rate policy of the country a "sovereign,"
"political" or "commercial" risk? Similarly, assume a government subsidy of a public sector entity which competes in the same business with
a private sector debtor. Is the government subsidy a "sovereign," "political" or "commercial risk" for the private sector debtor and its foreign
creditors?
2. Local Currency Deposit Procedure

Foreign currency debt of a private sector debtor may be restructured
as public sector debt through a local currency deposit procedure. The
procedure involves mutual agreement between private sector debtor, foreign creditor and public sector depository and obligor. There are three
basic steps: (a) the private sector debtor deposits local currency with the
public sector depository; (b) the public sector obligor issues a foreign
currency payment obligation in favor of the foreign creditor; and (c) the
foreign creditor accepts the foreign currency payment obligation of the
public sector obligor in lieu of the original foreign currency payment
obligation of the private sector debtor.
The procedure may be implemented for both interest and principal
payable in foreign currency. The procedure obviously requires mutual
agreement on the exchange rate at which foreign currency payment obligations of the public sector obligor are issued to the foreign creditor
against receipt of local currency deposits from the private sector debtor.
Public sector support for the private sector restructuring effort is particularly clear if the exchange rate is lower than the rate at which the private
sector debtor could otherwise obtain foreign exchange to pay foreign
currency debt. Nevertheless, the economic and legal implications of the
procedure are quite different from direct public sector assumption or
guaranty of private sector debt. The procedure requires a local currency
payment by the private sector debtor. Absent payment in local currency
by the private sector debtor, no public sector obligation is created. Thus,
the foreign creditor retains the commercial risk that the private sector
debtor cannot pay in local currency.
3. Public Sector Assurance of
Foreign Exchange Availability

Public sector assurance of the continuing availability of foreign exchange to service private sector debt is quite distinct from public sector
assumption or guaranty of private sector debt. Public sector assurance of
foreign exchange availability may be direct or indirect and may or may
VOL. 20, NO. 3
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not involve a foreign currency payment obligation from a public sector
obligor with respect to private sector debt.
Covenants and events of default in documentation governing public sector debt may provide indirect assurance of foreign exchange availability for
private sector debt. An example would be a covenant by which the sovereign agrees to permit private sector debtors to have access to foreign exchange on a basis comparable to the access available to public sector debtors. Such a covenant clearly does not involve a payment obligation of the
sovereign with respect to private sector debt, but violation of the covenant
could lead to an event of default with respect to the public sector debt. Such
a scenario would probably not produce payment of private sector debt.
Nevertheless, the combination of the covenant and event of default does
link public sector debt with the availability of foreign exchange to the private sector. The combination documents a business recognition of the linkage and may assure nondiscrimination in the allocation of foreign exchange
to the public and private sectors or provide the basis for negotiating the removal of discriminatory measures should any be introduced.
A more direct public sector assurance of foreign exchange availability
is foreign exchange insurance or a foreign exchange contract issued by a
public sector obligor with respect to private sector debt. The specifics of
this type of arrangement vary dramatically, but the essence is a public
sector obligation to provide foreign currency to a private sector debtor
to enable it to repay foreign currency debt to a foreign creditor. The public
sector obligation may be assigned or pledged as security by the private
sector debtor to the foreign creditor. Here, public sector support for
private sector debt is clearly evidenced by the public sector obligation to
provide foreign currency. But there may be additional linkage if the failure
to perform the foreign exchange assurance constitutes an event of default
under the documentation governing public sector debt or private sector
debt. There may be several layers of linkage in this situation: (a) that the
public sector obligor provides foreign exchange assurance with respect
to private sector debt; (b) that the failure to perform the exchange assurance is an event of default under the documentation governing the
public sector debt and/or private sector debt; (c) that the establishment
of a governmental program to provide foreign exchange assurance to
private sector debtors and their foreign creditors is a condition precedent
to the availability of funds under documentation providing new loans to
the public sector; or (d) that the failure to establish and implement such
a governmental program constitutes an event of default under the documentation governing the public sector debt and/or private sector debt.
Where foreign exchange assurance is available from the public sector, the
documentation for private sector debt must obviously be adjusted to the
specific governmental program, and this will vary from case to case.
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4. Government Policy
Restructuring private sector debt will be affected by government policy
on a spectrum of issues. The economic and financial viability of a private
sector debtor after debt restructuring may depend as much on government
policy as on the terms of the restructuring. The availability of domestic
credit within the country, price controls, wage policies, import restrictions, foreign investment laws and tax policy (e.g., (a) the permissible
extent of consolidation of gains and losses within an affiliated group of
private sector debtors and (b) withholding taxes on interest payments by
private sector debtors) illustrate some of many areas of government policy
which will affect both the terms of private sector debt restructuring and
the ability of the private sector debtor to recover economically and financially after the restructuring is complete.
C. ONLENDING AND RELENDING

While onlending and relending are not new concepts in some countries
having foreign exchange controls, both concepts are now frequently considered in the efforts to restructure foreign currency debt. Both onlending
and relending may involve direct linkage between public sector and private
sector debt restructuring. While both concepts are relatively clear, implementation involves complex technical issues in the documentation for
any particular case.
Onlending occurs in the context of a new money loan where the lender
and borrower agree that the loan proceeds from the foreign lender will
be made available by the contractual borrower to a specific third party
within the country of the borrower. Where the third party is a private
sector entity, the new loan to the public sector borrower would be allocated or "onlent" to the private sector entity.
Relending occurs in the context of the repayment of an existing or
restructured debt prior to the date on which the foreign creditor receives
and keeps foreign currency. When the first debtor repays the initial debt,
the funds are "relent" by the foreign creditor to a second debtor within
the country of the first debtor. The second debtor may repay prior to the
definitive repayment date, and the foreign creditor may "relend" again
to a third debtor within the country. On the definitive repayment date the
foreign creditor receives and keeps repayment of the foreign currency
from the debtor at the time. The premise of relending is that while the
foreign creditor agrees to defer its final receipt of foreign currency until
the definitive payment date (thereby deferring until such date the final
outflow of foreign currency from the country), the credit and credit risk
may be reallocated or relent by the foreign creditor within the country
among different public sector and private sector entities.
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V. Conclusion
The terms of any restructuring of foreign currency debt will be a complex answer to the basic questions of who pays, lends or defers payment
of how much, when and at what price. The complexity is compounded
by restructuring simultaneously the debt of more than one debtor and
increased exponentially by restructuring simultaneously both private sector debt and public sector debt of multiple debtors in both sectors of one
country. Simultaneous restructurings of the private sector and public sector debt are complex, irrespective of whether they occur independently
of each other or are directly or indirectly linked. To the extent there is
any linkage, the complexity of the effort is further compounded.
To note the complexity of any linkage is not to discourage the effort to
restructure simultaneously the foreign currency debt of both the public
sector and the private sector. In many cases the success or failure of a
debt restructuring for one sector will depend on the success or failure of
the debt restructuring for the other sector. Fundamental economics may
require and merit a total country debt restructure on a coordinated basis.
Here, government policymakers, foreign creditors and debtors in both
the public sector and private sector of the country will be challenged to
link in a creative and constructive manner the restructurings of the foreign
currency debt of both sectors. As the challenge is faced, the methods of
linking the restructure of public and private sector debt will continue to
evolve.
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